Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers by Kumru, Cagri & Yektas, Hadi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with
Risk Averse Buyers
Cagri Kumru and Hadi Yektas
Universtiy of Pittsburgh, University of Melbourne
9. March 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7575/
MPRA Paper No. 7575, posted 9. March 2008 05:41 UTC
Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
Ça¼gr¬S. Kumruy and Hadi Yektas¸z
December 2007
Abstract
We analyze the optimal auction of multiple non-identical objects when buyers are risk averse.
We show that the auction formats that yield the maximum revenue in the risk neutral case are
no longer optimal. In particular, selling the goods independently does not maximize the sellers
revenue. We observe that sellers incentive for bundling arises solely due to the risk aversion of
the buyers. The optimal auction which remains weakly e¢ cient has the following properties:
The seller perfectly insures all buyers against the risk of losing the object(s) for which they have
high valuation. While the buyers who have high valuation for both objects are compensated
if they do not win either object, the buyers who have low valuation for both objects incur a
positive payment to the seller in the same event.
Key words: Multi-object Auctions, Optimal Auctions, Multi-dimensional Screening, Risk
Averse Buyers, Bundling
JEL classication: D44, D81
We owe special thanks to Andreas Blume and Lise Vesterlund for their supreme supervision and endless encour-
agement throughout this project. For many helpful discussions and advice, we also thank James Amegashie, Leonce
Bargeron, Oliver Board, John Du¤y, Michael Hoy, Kenneth Lehn, Esther Gal-Or, Alexander Matros, Jack Ochs,
Utku Unver and participants of the Microeconomic Theory Workshop at the University of Pittsburgh, Fall 2005 Mid-
west Economic Theory and International Economics Conference at the University of Kansas, and 17th International
Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook University. All remaining errors are our own.
yDepartment of Economics, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia email:
cs.kumru@unsw.edu.au
zDepartment of Economics, University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia, email: hyektas@unimelb.edu.au
1
1 Introduction
Optimal selling mechanisms for multiple objects have been analyzed extensively due to their the-
oretical and practical importance (e.g., the spectrum auctions, second hand car auctions).1 One
of the main assumptions in these studies is that the buyers are risk neutral. However, in many
situations this assumption is violated and further analysis is needed.2
The optimal design problem in the presence of risk averse buyers can be described as follows:
When the number of objects is limited, the buyers face the risk of not getting the object(s) they
want. And in order to reduce this risk, the risk averse buyers, as compared to those that are risk
neutral, bid more aggressively.3 Therefore, in the presence of risk averse buyers, the seller will
be tempted to increase the magnitude of the risk so as to induce aggressive bidding and, in turn,
to increase the revenue from the sale. Yet, this comes with a trade-o¤, as the high type buyers
(namely, the ones who value the good highly), when confronted with too much risk, may nd it
more protable to follow the bidding strategy of the low type buyers or may even be discouraged
to participate.4 Therefore, a revenue maximizing selling scheme should impose "the right amount
risk" on "the right type of buyers".
For the case of single object, Maskin and Riley [19], Matthews [21], and Es½o [9] describe how
the above mentioned trade-o¤ should be balanced and observe that relaxing the risk neutrality
assumption delivers quite di¤erent results. In his seminal work, Myerson [24] shows that if the
buyers are risk neutral and their private valuations are independently distributed, then it is optimal
to give the object to the buyer who has the highest virtual valuation (not the actual valuation)
that exceeds the sellers outside option.5 Thus, the standard auctions, including the "high bid"
1See for example, Harris and Raviv [12], Maskin and Riley [20], Levin [16], Figueroa and Skreta [10].
2 In many auctions, the buyers are rms and they generally are risk neutral. Yet, rms whose ownership are non-
diversied (e.g. most family owned companies), those that are bound by liquidity constraints or under a nancial
distress, and those that are subject to a nonlinear tax system should be assumed to be risk averse. (Asplund [4])
Even a rm which is owned by risk-neutral shareholders may behave in a risk-averse manner if the control of the
rm is delegated to a risk-averse manager and his payment is linked to the rms performance.(i.e. through stock
options.)
Cox, et al. [7] show that the overbidding relative to Nash predictions (for the risk neutral environment) which has
been observed in the rst-price auction cannot be attributed to noisy-decision making, supporting the hypothesis
that it must be due to the risk aversion of the buyers.
3See, for example, Maskin and Riley [19] and Matthews [21].
4As we know from the optimal auction literature, it may be desirable to exclude the low-type (and in some
environments the high-type) buyers from the auction. (Exclusion Principle) Yet, if the seller imposes too much risk
on all types then she will herself face the greatestrisk of no sale, hence ending up with zero prot.
5Virtual valuations are the adjusted valuations that take into account buyers informational rents and, more
precisely, are dened as  i(vi) = vi  [1 Fi(vi)]=fi(vi); if buyer is valuation vi is distributed according to cumulative
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and "English" auctions, with appropriately chosen reserve price are all optimal. He further shows
that any two auctions with the same allocation rule are revenue equivalent if the expected utility
of each buyer in some benchmark case is the same, the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem.
To the contrary, if the buyers are risk averse, the standard auctions with appropriate reserve price
neither generate the same expected revenue nor are they optimal. (Maskin and Riley [19], Matthews
[21]).6 Another contrast is observed when the buyersvaluations are correlated: If the buyers are
risk neutral, then the seller can fully extract the informational rents using an e¢ cient auction
(Crémer and McLean [8]), but she cannot do so if the buyers are risk averse, unless the correlation
is su¢ ciently strong. (Es½o [9]).7
In the light of these works, the current paper studies the optimal design problem for the case
of multiple objects and seeks answers to the following two naturally-arising questions:
1. How does the optimal multi-object auction with risk-averse buyers compare to that with
risk-neutral buyers?
2. Which features of the optimal single-object auction with risk averse buyers carry over to the
optimal multi-object auction?
To answer the rst question, we compare our results with those of Armstrong [1] who, in a binary
model, characterizes the optimal multi-object auction for risk-neutral buyers.8 This comparison
provides a threefold answer.
One, in both problems, the optimal auction is weakly e¢ cient.9 ;10
distribution function Fi(:) with associated density function fi(:).
6 In a second price auction, the buyers bid truthfully regardless of their risk preference. But in the rst price
auction, a risk-averse buyer shades his bid less than a risk-neutral buyer. As a result, the rst price auction yields
more revenue than the second price auction. Nevertheless, the rst price auction is not optimal because it imposes
too much risk on the high type buyers.
7Optimal auction should remove the risk from high type buyers, which requires providing insurance (and hence
leaving some surplus) to them.
8Armstrong [1] inherited his setting from Armstrong and Rochet [2], who study a principal-agent problem. Both
of these papers and the current paper assume that buyers/agents have multidimensional private information and, in
this regard, di¤er from the references mentioned in footnote 1.
Manelli and Vincent [17] and Manelli and Vincent [18] also assume multidimensional private information, but
di¤erent from the current paper, they assume a single buyer.
9Weak e¢ ciency requires each object to be given to the buyer with the highest valuation whenever it is sold. Some
of the objects can be kept by the seller eventhough there is a buyer who has valuation that exceeds that of the seller.
For strong e¢ ciency, on the other hand, the objects valued more highly by a buyer than the seller must always be
sold. In this sense, the optimal auctions in Myerson [24] are weakly e¢ cient.
10 It must be noted, though, that the optimal multi-object auction is no longer weakly e¢ cient when the model
assumes a continuous type space.
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Two, none of the auction formats that are shown to be optimal in Armstrong [1] maximize the
sellers revenue when the buyers are risk averse. In particular, it is not optimal to sell the two
objects independently. This is our main result. The sharp contrast is due to the way in which
the objects are allocated in the state all buyers have low valuation for both objects. (That is,
all buyers are of type LL.) The optimal auctions, in the risk neutral case, can take the form of
independent auction, bundling auction, or mixed auction, depending on how buyersvaluations are
correlated across objects.11 ;12 These three formats allocate each object independently and randomly
if all buyers are of type LL. However, doing so does not impose high enough risk on type LL.
Contrarily, we show that, with risk averse buyers the optimal auction must give both objects to
the same (LL type) buyer in this state.13 ;14 Since the seller does not observe the buyerstypes ex
ante, she cannot sell the goods independently.
Three, in the risk neutral case, only the expected payments conditional on buyerstype matter
in the design of the optimal scheme. That is, any two selling schemes with the same allocation
rule but di¤erent payment rule, yield the same revenue to the seller if the buyersex ante expected
payment conditional on their own type is the same. On the other hand, we show that, when
the buyers are risk averse, the seller can improve the revenue by making the expected payments
conditional also on the type and the number of the objects that the buyer wins. Moreover, it is not
optimal to make these expected payments random.15
For the second question, we do a robustness check in order to see to what extent our results,
11 In all three forms, the buyers have the same expected probability of winning the object(s) for which they have
high valuation. These forms di¤er only in the expected probability of winning the objects for which buyers have low
valuation. In a mixed auction, a buyer who has low valuation, say, for object A but high valuation for object B, is
assigned object A more often than a buyer who has low valuation for both objects. While independent auctions dont
distinguish between these two types for object A, bundling auction perfectly discriminates against the type that has
low valuations for both objects. It should be noted that the bundling auction allows the goods to end up in the hands
of di¤erent buyers.
12Avery and Hendershott [5] also consider risk-neutral buyers. While Armstrong [1] assumes that all buyers have
demand for both objects, in Avery and Hendershott [5], only one buyer demands multiple objects and the remaining
buyers demand only one or the other. Not surprisingly, the optimal auction in the latter paper may not be weakly
e¢ cient due to the good deal of asymmetry among buyers. Yet, even in that case, the optimal auction bundles the
objects probabilistically for the multi-demand buyer.
13 It is riskier to lose both objects than to lose a single object.
14 In Armstrong [1], bundling is optimal only when buyersvaluations are negatively correlated across objects, or in
other words, when a buyers high value for one object, say A, is likely to be accompanied by a relatively low value for
the other object, say B. The goods are bundled only for the types HL or LH. In this case, their incentive conditions
in all directions are binding.
In the current paper, we show that the seller utilizes bundling not only to make the desired incentive conditions
binding but also to increase the risk as much as possible for type LL.
15This also implies that it is not optimal to make the payments dependent on other buyersreports.
4
which we obtain in a binary model, are comparable to those of the current literature which assumes
continuous distribution of types. (Namely, Maskin and Riley [19] and Matthews [21])16 We observe
that the optimal single-object auction in the binary model replicates the behavior of that of the
continuous model at the two extremes of the type space. This analogy helps us interpret our results
regarding the features of the optimal multi-object auction: The seller perfectly insures all buyers
against the risk of losing the object(s) for which they have the high(est) valuation. The buyers
who are (most) eager to win both objects (namely, type HH) are compensated if they lose both
objects. On the other hand, those (most) reluctant to win both objects (namely, type LL) must
incur a positive payment to the seller if they lose both objects.17
The intuition for our results is as follows: While, on one hand, the seller would like to screen
the buyers, on the other hand, she would like to confront them with risk. Screening the buyers
requires leaving informational rents to (and, in turn, decreasing the risk for) the buyers who have
high valuation for either or both objects. As a result, the buyersmarginal utility of income must
remain the same regardless of whether they win or lose the objects for which they have high
valuation. This also implies providing perfect insurance to type HH. On the other hand, the
buyers who have low value for both objects must confront the highest risk from which the seller
benets in two ways: One, she makes imitating LL unattractive to the other types and two, she
fully extracts the informational rents from type LL. Confronting these types with the highest risk
involves not only bundling the objects whenever all buyers are LL but also collecting payments
from them even when they lose both objects.
The current paper contributes substantially to the literature on bundling.18 From the existing
literature, some of the reasons as to why the bundling decision of a monopoly arises are: to
take advantage of economies of scale and/or economies of scope, to reduce the transaction and
information costs, to facilitate entering a new market, to signal the quality of the unknown product,
to reduce the divergence in incentives, to acquire and maintain monopoly power and to exclude
16Matthews [21] studies the same problem as Maskin and Riley [19]. While the former assumes a particular form
of utility function, namely CARA, and obtains necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an auction to be optimal, the
latter considers di¤erent forms of risk aversion and characterize the properties of the optimal auction for all of these
forms.
17A natural question to ask is how the punishment for type LL can be implemented in real life. When there is a
single object, the optimal auction reduces to a modied rst price auction for some parameter values. (Maskin and
Riley [19]) The seller charges an entry fee, but she does not return it to the buyers with low valuation if they dont
win the object.
18See Kobayshi [15] for a recent review of the literature.
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possible entrants. Bundling may also arise when the goods are complementary, when valuations
across objects are negatively correlated or when the positive correlation is weak. In the absence of
the above-mentioned inuences, we show that the incentive for bundling results solely due to the
risk aversion of buyers.
We comment on the solution methods used in this paper: In section 2, we describe the optimal
single object auction in reduced form, meaning we construct the buyers expected probability of
obtaining the object (contingent only on his own type), rather than his actual probability of winning
as a function of all buyerstypes. This technique was also utilized by Matthews [21] and Maskin and
Riley [19] in order to avoid the computational complexity that risk aversion involves.19 Yet, when
solving the sellers optimal design problem in reduced form, in addition to the incentive constraints
and the participation constraints, one must also impose the so-called implementability constraints
that guarantee the existence of the actual probabilities.20
The number of implementability constraints increases exponentially with the number of goods
(or more precisely with the number of elements in the type space), nevertheless Armstrong [1] was
still able to solve the problem in reduced form. However in our problem with risk averse buyers, the
correlation between the events of winning object A and object B also matters for the buyers (and in
turn for the seller), making it very di¢ cult, if not impossible, to characterize the implementability
conditions that one needs to impose.21 Therefore, in section 3, we describe the optimal auction
in non-reduced form and construct the actual probabilities of the events that a buyer can possibly
face as functions of the entire type prole (as reported by all participating buyers).22 Since the
buyers dont observe their opponentstypes, only the expected probabilities of observing each event
(conditional only on ones type) matter in the incentive conditions. Therefore, we also make use of
these expected probabilities throughout our analysis.23
19The technique was introduced to the literature by Myerson [24].
20When there is a single object or when the buyers are risk neutral, these conditions take a very simple form, which,
can be interpreted as the probability that a buyer whose type belongs to a given subset of the type space obtains a
particular object cannot be higher than the probability that there is a buyer whose type is in that subset.
The implementability conditions need to be imposed because the seller has only a limited number of each type of
good. A multi-product monopolist who has unlimited number of each type of good does not face this constraint.
(See Manelli and Vincent [17] and Manelli and Vincent [18])
21Using the main result of Border[6] (Also footnote 28), Armstrong [1] was able to describe the implementability
conditions. In his environment, the main di¢ culty is to identify the conditions that are binding at the optimum. In
the current paper, on the other hand, Border[6]s theorem is not applicable.
22These events are winning only object A, only object B, winning both objects and winning nothing.
23 In regard to the solution method, this paper is also related to Menicucci [22] which extends Armstrong [1] by
allowing for a synergy if the two goods end up in the hands of the same buyer. He shows that in this case the optimal
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we construct the optimal
single-object auction for risk averse buyers in a binary framework and analyze its properties. In
Section 3, we assume two objects are for sale and we characterize the properties of the optimal
auction when buyer valuations are strongly and positively correlated across objects. Finally, in
section 4, we discuss the main results and their implications.
2 Optimal Single-Object Auctions
2.1 Description of the Problem
A single indivisible object is to be sold to one of n  2 potential buyers, whose private valuations
are discretely distributed according to a random variable vi, which takes values vH with probability
H > 0 and vL with probability L > 0 such that H + L = 1: Without loss of generality,
we assume vH > vL > 0; so that vH and vL denote valuations of high-type (eager) and low-type
(reluctant) buyers, respectively. Buyer valuations are distributed independently and identically.
Buyers are risk-averse and have a constant measure of absolute risk aversion (CARA). In particular,
their preferences are represented by a utility function u(!) =   e r!r ; where r(> 0) measures the
level of risk aversion. Note that, u0(:) > 0 and u00(:) < 0. Specically, if a buyer with valuation v
wins the object and incurs a net payment of  then his utility is u(v   ) =   e r(v )r : The seller
is risk-neutral and her valuation for the object is zero. Both the seller and the buyers are expected
utility maximizers.
The sellers problem is to design a selling scheme that maximizes her expected revenue.24 Such a
scheme generally consists of a message set,M =M1Mn; and an outcome function,  :M ! ~A;
that maps the list of messages, m 2M; into a possibly random allocation ~a 2 ~A = ~A1    ~An:25
Buyersbehavior is described by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, s = (s1; :::; sn); where sb : b !Mb
is the equilibrium strategy of buyer b; sb(b) representing the message that maximizes buyer bs
expected utility given that his type is b and all buyers other than him follow the equilibrium
auction is likely to allocate the goods ine¢ ciently.
24Milgrom [23] denes an auction to be a mechanism (scheme) to allocate resources among a group of bidders.
Therefore, we use these three terms interchangeably.
25An allocation consists of a decision about who is going to get which object(s) and possibly negative monetary
transfers from buyers to the seller.
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strategy.26 So, any selling scheme, in a given equilibrium, will result in an outcome represented by
 (s1(1); :::; sn(n)); if the buyerstype prole is (1; :::; n):
Alternatively, when looking for the optimal selling scheme, attention can be restricted to the
revelation schemes in which the message space is the type space, : This is because any alloca-
tion,  (s1(1); :::; sn(n)), resulting from an equilibrium of an arbitrary selling scheme can also be
obtained in a revelation scheme in which the outcome is determined via the composite function
  s :  ! ~A and truth-telling is an equilibrium (Revelation Principle).27 Thus, the sellers
problem can be reduced to nding the optimal revelation scheme in which the buyers are willing
to participate (individual rationality) and have incentive to truthfully report their type (incentive
compatibility).
Given a prole of reports, a selling scheme must, most generally, assign each buyer a probability
of winning, a payment in case he wins and another payment in case he loses. That is, the outcome
is determined by functions of the form  b(m) = (pb(m); ~t
w
b (m); ~t
l
b(m)) for b = 1; :::; n, where tildes
represent the possibility that the payment functions are random. Since there is only one object for
sale, a feasible scheme must satisfy
Pn
b=1 pb(m1; :::;mn)  1 for all (m1; :::;mn):
Given an equilibrium, we can calculate buyer bs expected probability of winning and his expected
random payments in case of winning and losing, respectively, as
b(mb) = E b[pb(m) j mb] (1)
~wb (mb) = E b[~t
w
b (m) j mb] (2)
~ lb(mb) = E b[t
l
b(m) j mb]: (3)
Since buyers are ex ante identical, only the schemes that treat them symmetrically need to be
considered. This is because, for any asymmetric scheme, we can construct a symmetric scheme
that generates the same revenue as the proposed asymmetric scheme. Symmetric schemes satisfy
26 In this section, each type of a buyer corresponds to a possible valuation , namely j = fvH ; vLg for all j = 1; :::; n,
whereas, in the next section, there are four di¤erent types of buyers. That is, j = fHH;HL;LH;LLg for all
j = 1; :::; n; where the rst (second) letter in each type represents buyer js value for object A (B).
27See Myerson [24].
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the following condition:
For any b; b0 2 f1; :::; ng and any m;m0 2M;
 b(m) =  b0(m
0)
if mb = m
0
b0 ;mb0 = m
0
b; and for all b
00 6= b; b0 mb00 = m0b00 :
Therefore, in a symmetric scheme, the expected probability and the expected payments of two
di¤erent buyers submitting the same message are equal. Hence, we can drop the subscript on each
of the functions in 1-3. Describing a selling scheme from the perspective of an arbitrary buyer,
using (:); ~w(:); ~ l(:), is called reduced form representation.
Three points need to be emphasized about our approach to solving the sellers problem. First,
using the Revelation Principle, we consider only the revelation schemes that satisfy two sets of
conditions: individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
Second, we construct the optimal auction in reduced form. We justify this by imposing another
set of conditions called implementability conditions.28 These conditions make sure that the reduced
form probability, (:); is implementable, that is, they make sure that there exists a symmetric
auction with actual allocation probabilities, p(:), which satises
(mb) = E[p(m) j mb]: (4)
The nal point is that we initially consider only the schemes in which the expected payments
contingent on winning and losing are nonrandom. In other words, we rst construct the optimal
28Border [6] states the necessary and su¢ cient conditions, for the reduced form probabilities to be implementable.
We include the proposition for easy reference:
Let (S;) be a measurable space of possible types of bidders and (:) be a probability measure on S. Dene an
auction to be a measurable function p : Sn ! [0; 1]n satisfying Pni=1 pi(s)  1 for all s 2 Sn: Dene an auction to be
symmetric if pi(s) is independent of i. Given an auction, dene
i(si) =
Z
Sn 1
p(s1; :::; sn)d(s1; :; si 1;si+1;::; sn)
to be the probability that a buyer i wins when he reports his type as si:
Then  is implementable by a symmetric auction if and only if for each measurable set of types A 2 , the following
inequality is satised: Z
A
(s)d(s)  1  (A
c)n
n
Furthermore, if S is a topological space and  is a regular Borel probability on S; then  may be replaced by either
the open subsets or the closed subsets of S.
9
scheme within the class of schemes for which ~w(:) and ~ l(:) are deterministic. (So, we drop the
tildes.) Later, in proposition 6, we establish that this scheme is also optimal among all selling
schemes, including those that assign random payments.
To summarize, the sellers problem is to construct the optimal revelation scheme, the reduced
form of which can be represented by six variables, fi; wi ;  ligi=H;L, where i 2 [0; 1] denotes the
probability that a buyer wins the object when he reports a valuation of vi, and wi ; 
l
i 2 R denote
the net deterministic payments that the same type of buyer incurs when he wins and loses the
object, respectively. As mentioned above three sets of conditions are imposed:
If a buyer with valuation vi reports vj then his utility is equal to ju(vi  wj )+ (1  j)u(  lj):
Thus, buyers truthfully reveal their valuations if the auction satises the following two incentive
compatibility conditions:
Hu(vH   wH) + (1  H)u(  lH)  Lu(vH   wL) + (1  L)u(  lL)
Lu(vL   wL) + (1  L)u(  lL)  Hu(vL   wH) + (1  H)u(  lH):
Buyers are free to participate in the auction. Thus, participating buyers satisfy the individual
rationality conditions of the form
Hu(vH   wH) + (1  H)u(  lH)  u(0)
Lu(vL   wL) + (1  L)u(  lL)  u(0):
Finally, the implementability conditions take the following form in our binary model:
n(LL + HH)  1 (IMfH;Lg)
nHH  1  nL (IMfHg)
nLL  1  nH : (IMfLg)
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One can interpret these conditions as follows: the probability the object is won by a buyer who
belongs to a particular subset of the type space should be no greater than the probability that
there is a buyer who belongs to that subset.29
The sellers revenue is the sum of the expected payments made by each buyer. Since buyers are
ex ante identical the sellers revenue can be written in terms of the expected payments made by an
arbitrary buyer (namely, the term in the bracket):
 = n[H(H
w
H + (1  H) lH) + L(LwL + (1  L) lL)]:
To sum up, the sellers problem is to choose a reduced form scheme, fi; wi ;  ligi=H;L; that
maximizes  subject to the two incentive compatibility conditions, the two individual rationality
conditions, and the three implementability conditions.
For convenience, we dene ci = e rvi and yki = e
rki . Note that, 0 < cH < cL < 1 and yki > 0
for all i and k: So, we can rewrite the sellers problem as
max
fi;ywi ;yligi=H;L
 =
n
r
[H(H ln y
w
H + (1  H) ln ylH) + L(L ln ywL + (1  L) ln ylL)] (5)
subject to
HcHy
w
H + (1  H)ylH  LcHywL + (1  L)ylL (ICH)
LcLy
w
L + (1  L)ylL  HcLywH + (1  H)ylH (ICL)
HcHy
w
H + (1  H)ylH  1 (IRH)
LcLy
w
L + (1  L)ylL  1 (IRL)
n(LL + HH)  1 (IMfH;Lg)
nHH  1  nL (IMfHg)
nLL  1  nH (IMfLg)
29Armstrong [1] alternatively calls these conditions resource constraints.
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and the non-negativity conditions H ; L  0:
For convenience, we refer to the left-hand side of the inequalities in IRH and IRL as DH
and DL, respectively. Similarly, right hand side of ICH and ICL are referred to as DLH and D
H
L ,
respectively. The subscripts denote a buyers actual type, whereas superscripts denote the type he
is imitating.
2.2 Solution to the Problem
Since cL > cH , ICH and IRL together imply IRH .30 Hence, this condition is redundant. For now,
we also ignore ICL when we solve the sellers problem. That is, we suppose that the low-type
buyers do not have the incentive to misrepresent their types. Below, in proposition 5, we prove
that this is indeed the case.
Denition 1 The relaxed problem is dened to be a design problem that ignores the upward incen-
tive constraints.
The following lemma shows that when only the downward incentive conditions are considered,
high-types incentive condition and low-types individual rationality condition must be binding.
Lemma 1 In the relaxed problem, where ICL is ignored, the constraints ICH and IRL must be
binding.
The seller may want to increase her revenue by excluding the low-type buyers from the auction
if, for a given distribution of types, their valuation is small enough compared to that of the high-
type buyers.31 This results in an ine¢ ciency, because with positive probability the seller keeps the
object even if all buyers value the object more highly than her.
Ine¢ ciency may also be due to a misallocation of the objects. To be consistent with Armstrong
[1], we focus only on the latter kind of ine¢ ciency, by assuming that the goods are always sold,
i.e. L > 0.
32 In this case, it is optimal for the seller to leave informational rents to the high-type
buyers.
30DH  DLH  DL  1, where the second inequality is due to cH < cL:
31The same behavior is also observed when a monopolist implements second-degree price discrimination.
32Clearly, high-type buyers should not be excluded from participating in the auction if revenue is maximized. That
is, H must be strictly positive. If not, then the incentive conditions would imply LcL  LcH ; and since cL > cH
this in turn would imply L = 0; meaning the good is not sold, at all. Yet, the seller can always guarantee a positive
prot by posting a xed price of vL > 0:
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Lemma 2 At the optimum, if the low-type buyers are not excluded from the auction, then IRH
must be slack.
The following proposition states that it is not optimal to impose any risk on the high-type
buyers. The risk is fully eliminated for them.
Proposition 1 High-type buyers are fully insured against the risk of losing the object.
Through insurance, a high-types marginal utility of income in cases of winning and losing is
made the same. Eliminating the risk rewards the high-type buyer for revealing his true type.
If the seller does not pay informational rents to the high type buyer (wH = vH), perfect (full)
insurance requires that the seller sets the high type buyers payment contingent on losing equal
to zero ( lH = 0) in order to keep him at the same level of utility. However, when there is
an information gap between the seller and the buyers, high-type buyers should receive information
rent to be active. In this case (i.e. wH < vH), perfect insurance requires that the seller compensates
the high type buyer ( lH > 0).
Proposition 2 High-type buyers are compensated if they lose the object.
Using proposition 1, we can write the sellers prot as
 =
n
r
[H(H ln
1
cH
+ ln ylH) + L(L ln
ywL
ylL
+ ln ylL)] (6)
Note that, since 0 < cH < 1, the sellers prot is strictly increasing with respect to H . Thus, given
the values of other variables, H must be set as high as possible at the optimum. This implies that
either IMfHg or IMfH;Lg, or both are binding.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to ywL and y
l
L can be written as
@L
@ywL
= LL
1
ywL
  LLcL + HLcH = 0
@L
@ylL
= L(1  L)
1
ylL
  L(1  L) + H(1  L) = 0:
Since LL
1
ywL
> 0; these two equations together yield
ywL
ylL
=
L   H
LcL   HcH
: (7)
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Note that the right-hand side of equation 7 is smaller than 1cH : So, we have
ywL
ylL
<
1
cH
: (8)
This condition has a very nice implication: At the optimum, iso-revenue curve must be atter than
the line corresponding to the implementability condition IMfH;Lg.33
Thus, IMfHg and IMfH;Lg are both binding and the optimal allocation probabilities can be
calculated as
H =
1 nL
nH
; L =
n 1L
n
(9)
which is the point where the iso-revenue curve (6) is tangent to the feasible set that is bound by
the implementability conditions (Figure 1)
It is not surprising to see that the allocation probabilities that we have obtained in 9 are the
same as those in the risk-neutral environment. The optimal allocation is monotonic with respect
to buyer types in either case.
Note that, nLL = 
n
L , meaning the probability that the object is won by a low-type buyer
is equal to the probability that all buyers are low-type. In other words, the object is won by a
high-type buyer whenever there is one. Hence, the proposition follows.
Proposition 3 The optimal auction is weakly e¢ cient.
Contrary to the insurance provided to the high-type buyers, the seller confronts the low-type
buyers with risk by making their marginal utilities vary in cases of winning and losing. In this
circumstance, a high-type buyer who considers imitating the low-type buyers would face a greater
risk, and will eventually reveal his own true valuation. Hence, it is optimal for the seller to relax
the high-type buyers incentive constraint and not to o¤er insurance to the low-type buyers. The
following proposition states that at the optimum low-type buyersmarginal utility of income is
greater when he wins the object than when he loses it.
Proposition 4 Low-type buyers are better o¤ winning than losing: cLywL < y
l
L: Moreover, in
33This condition is equivalent to L ln(y
w
L=y
l
L)
H ln(1=cH )
< L
H
; where the left hand side of the inequality is slope of the
iso-prot curve and the right hand side is the slope of the line corresponding to the implementability condition
IMfH;Lg:
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Figure 1: Single object - Optimal allocation probabilities are the same regardless of buyersrisk
attitude.
case of losing the object, they incur a payment that is less than what they would pay if they win:
1 < ylL < y
w
L :
Next, we show that the solution to the relaxed problem also solves the full problem that does
not ignore ICL.
Proposition 5 Low-type buyers do not have the incentive to misrepresent their type. That is, ICL
is slack.
The reduced form of the revelation scheme that weve constructed above is optimal within the
class of schemes in which the expected payments contingent on winning and losing are deterministic.
Finally, we establish that making twi and t
l
i random has a negative e¤ect on sellers revenue.
Proposition 6 If buyer preferences are represented by CARA, then, in an optimal auction, the
payments, twi and t
l
i; must be deterministic.
Remark 1 Above proposition also implies that it is not protable for the seller to condition the
payments made by a buyer on the realizations of his opponentstypes.
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3 Optimal Multi-object Auctions
3.1 Description of the Problem
Now, there are two nonidentical objects, denoted A and B, to be sold to n  2 buyers: The
sellers valuation for both objects is zero, whereas buyer valuations are random and described by
a pair (vA; vB), where vo denotes the buyers valuation for object o. Suppose that vo 2 fvoH ; voLg,
where the subscripts denote whether the buyer is of high-type (H) or low-type (L). Thus, we
assume voH   voL > 0. There are four types of buyers corresponding to the four possibilities
(vAH ; v
B
H); (v
A
H ; v
B
L ); (v
A
L ; v
B
H) and (v
A
L ; v
B
L ): Using a slightly shorter notation, we dene the set of
possible types as  = fHH;HL;LH;LLg. A typical element of this set is denoted with ij; where
i represents a buyers valuation for object A and j represents his valuation for object B. Types
are independently and identically distributed across buyers according to a probability measure 
over , so that the probability that a buyer is of type ij is represented by ij : The marginal prob-
ability that a buyer has a high value for object A is denoted with AH = HH + HL: Similarly,
AL = LH + LL denotes the marginal probability that the buyer has a low value for object A: In
the same fashion, we dene BH = HH+LH and 
B
L = HL+LL to be the marginal probabilities
that the buyer has a high and low value for object B, respectively.
Each buyer is risk-averse and has preferences represented by the common CARA utility function
of the form u(!) =   e r!r , where r > 0. In the event that a buyer wins object(s) of a (total) value
v and incurs a net payment  , his utility will be equal to u(v ): For example, if a buyer wins only
object A when his valuation for that object is vAL and incurs a net payment 
A then his utility is
equal to u(vAL   A): Similarly, if a buyer of type HL wins both objects and incurs a net payment
AB then his utility will be u(vAH + v
B
L   AB): Both the seller and the buyers are expected utility
maximizers.34
The sellers problem is to design a selling scheme that maximizes her revenue. In view of the
Revelation Principle, we solve this problem within the class of revelation schemes which satisfy
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.35 Furthermore, as justied in the
34We assume that there are no economies of scope in the production of the bundle nor are there complementarities
in the consumption of the bundle. We make this assumption so as to isolate the role that bundling has on the sellers
ability to extract the consumer surplus.
35Remember that in a revelation scheme, buyers are asked to report their types.
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previous section, among the revelation schemes, we focus only on the symmetric ones in which the
buyers of the same type are treated the same.
Let nij be the number of buyers of type ij and  = (nHH ; nHL; nLH ; nLL) be the vector repre-
senting the prole of reports where
P
ij2 nij = n. Then, a symmetric revelation scheme can most
generally be described with two sets of rules:
 a decision rule, pkij(); that assigns each type ij 2  probabilities of realizing possible events
k = A;B;AB;O, for each prole of reports . Given ; the decision rule must satisfy
X
ij2 nij [p
A
ij() + p
AB
ij ()]  1 (10)X
ij2 nij [p
B
ij() + p
AB
ij ()]  1 (11)
pAij() + p
B
ij() + p
AB
ij () + p
O
ij() = 1 8ij 2  (12)
 a payment rule, ~tkij(), that, for each prole of reports ; assigns each type ij 2  possibly
random payments to be made to the seller at each possible event k = A;B;AB;O.
The decision rule species the probability that a buyer b of type ij realizes the valuations vAi ,
vBj , v
A
i + v
B
j or 0. We abuse the notation and list these four events respectively as:
Event A - winning only object A
Event B - winning only object B
Event AB - winning both object A and object B
Event O - winning neither object.
Remember from Armstrong [1] that the risk-neutral buyers are only interested in the marginal
probabilities of winning the objects. For risk-averse buyers, on the other hand, the correlation
between the events of winning object A and object B matters. The decision rule in the above
specication takes this into consideration.
Note that, pAij()+p
AB
ij (), in 10, represents the marginal probability of winning object A which
we shortly denote with p^Aij(): Similarly, p
B
ij()+ p
AB
ij (), in 11, represents the marginal probability
of obtaining object B which is denoted with p^Bij(). Thus, conditions 10 and 11 are the resource
constraints representing the fact that there is only one unit of each object. Condition 12 states
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that the events A;B;AB and O are all inclusive.
Although the payment rule allows the seller impose random payments, when we solve the sellers
problem, we assume ~tkij() = 
k
ij where 
k
ij 2 R for all ij 2  and k = A;B;AB;O, and characterize
the optimal scheme within the class of schemes that assign deterministic payments. We will show
later that imposing random payments to each type ij under each event k cannot improve the sellers
revenue.
Now, dene an ij type buyers expected probability of realizing the event k = A;B;AB;O as
kij =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
pkij(nHH ; nHL; nLH ; nLL)	
nij
ij
(13)
where 	 = (n 1)!
nHH
HH 
nHL
HL 
nLH
LH 
nLL
LL
nHH !nHL!nLH !nLL!
: For any nij > 0; 	
nij
ij
denotes the probability that the buyer
prole is  = (nHH ; nHL; nLH ; nLL) given that there is one ij in that prole (of course, conditional
on incentive constraints hold).36
The reduced form of a symmetric revelation scheme, then, can be represented with
fAij ; Bij ; ABij ; Oij ; Aij ; Bij ; ABij ; Oijgij2:
Aij and 
B
ij are type ijs expected probability of winning object A or B, alone; whereas 
AB
ij is his
probability of winning both objects. Apparently, Oij = 1 Aij Bij ABij represents the probability
of winning neither object. kij is the net deterministic payment that type ij must incur if event k
occurs.
Then, the utility of a buyer of type ij who misrepresents his type as i0j0 is
Ai0j0u(v
A
i   Ai0j0) + Bi0j0u(vBj   Bi0j0) + ABi0j0 u(vAi + vBj   ABi0j0 ) + Oi0j0u( Oi0j0):
Let coi = e
 rvoi for o = A;B and i = H;L and ykij = e
rkij for k 2 K = fA;B;AB;Og and
ij 2 : Then a scheme is individually rational if, for each type ij 2 ;
Dij  AijcAi yAij + BijcBj yBij + ABij cAi cBj yABij + OijyOij  1:
36The multinomial distribution is used.
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An auction is incentive compatible if, for any ij 2  and i0j0 2  n f ijg;
Dij  Ai0j0cAi yAi0j0 + Bi0j0cBj yBi0j0 + ABi0j0 cAi cBj yABi0j0 + Oi0j0yOi0j0  Di
0j0
ij :
The sellers revenue can, then, be written in terms of the expected payment of an arbitrary
buyer, namely the term in brackets:
 = n[
X
ij2
fij
X
k2K
kij
k
ijg]: (14)
Note that, kij =
1
r ln y
k
ij : Then, if the reduced form probabilities are implementablewe can
write the sellers problem in reduced form as
max
fkij ;ykijgij2;k2K
n
r
X
ij2
fij
X
k2K
kij ln y
k
ijg (SP)
subject to
Dij  1 ij 2  (15)
Dij  Di
0j0
ij ij 2 ; i0j0 2  n fijg (16)
Since the buyers are risk-averse, the correlation between the events of winning object A (namely,
event A[AB ) and object B (namely, event B [AB) matters for the buyers and also for the seller
through 14. Thus, Borders [6] theorem does not apply to this problem.37 As it is also mentioned in
Armstrong [1], the conditions that we need to impose to ensure that the reduced form probabilities
are implementable are not clear. For this reason, di¤erent from the previous section, we aim to
construct the actual probabilities, pkij(); 8ij 2 , k = A;B;AB and 8.38 Given a payment
rule, the optimality of a decision rule will be analyzed as follows: For any modication of pkij();
we will rst describe how expected probabilities kij will be a¤ected. Then, we gure out whether
the incentive constraints in 16 and individual rationality constraints in 15 hold and whether the
objective function (SP) increases after the modication. To demonstrate how this works, we borrow
37See footnote 28.
38Given ij and , pOij() can be calculated using 13 and the values of p
A
ij(); p
B
ij(), and p
AB
ij () are found.
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the following example from Menicucci [22]:
Suppose for a given prole of reports with nHH  1 and nLH  1 each type wins object A with
probability 1nHH and each type LH wins object B with probability

nLH
(0 <   1). Note that
from 13, this generates a contribution to BLH equal to

nLH
	
nLH
LH
:
Consider reducing  by  > 0 while increasing by  the probability that the same buyer of type
HH winning object A will also win object B. Then,
BLH =  

nLH
	
nLH
LH
AHH =  

nHH
	
nHH
HH
=  ABHH :
So, ABHH =  AHH =   LHHHBLH : We can then evaluate the protability of reducing  since
the sellers prot function and the constraints are linear with respect to the expected probabilities.
3.2 Solution to the problem
Before we attempt to solve problem SP, note that, since 0 < cH < cL, incentive compatibility
conditions imply that among the individual rationality conditions only the one corresponding to
type LL matters.
3.2.1 The relaxed problem
Using the same approach as in Armstrong [1], we rst solve the sellers problem considering only the
ve downward incentive constraints, that ensure that a buyer does not underreport his valuation
for an object. We show ex post that the remaining constraints are satised (Propositions 14 and
15).
Thus, the seller solves
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max HHfAHH ln yAHH + BHH ln yBHH + ABHH ln yABHH + OHH ln yOHHg
+HLfAHL ln yAHL + BHL ln yBHL + ABHL ln yABHL + OHL ln yOHLg
+LHfALH ln yALH + BLH ln yBLH + ABLH ln yABLH + OLH ln yOLHg
+LLfALL ln yALL + BLL ln yBLL + ABLL ln yABLL + OLL ln yOLLg
subject to
ALLc
A
Ly
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Ly
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Lc
B
Ly
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL  1 (IRLL)
ALHc
A
Ly
A
LH + 
B
LHc
B
Hy
B
LH + 
AB
LHc
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LH + 
O
LHy
O
LH
 ALLcALyALL + BLLcBHyBLL + ABLL cALcBHyABLL + OLLyOLL (ICLLLH)
AHLc
A
Hy
A
HL + 
B
HLc
B
Ly
B
HL + 
AB
HLc
A
Hc
B
Ly
AB
HL + 
O
HLy
O
HL
 ALLcAHyALL + BLLcBLyBLL + ABLL cAHcBLyABLL + OLLyOLL (ICLLHL)
AHHc
A
Hy
A
HH + 
B
HHc
B
Hy
B
HH + 
AB
HHc
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
HH + 
O
HHy
O
HH
 ALLcAHyALL + BLLcBHyBLL + ABLL cAHcBHyABLL + OLLyOLL (ICLLHH)
AHHc
A
Hy
A
HH + 
B
HHc
B
Hy
B
HH + 
AB
HHc
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
HH + 
O
HHy
O
HH
 ALHcAHyALH + BLHcBHyBLH + ABLHcAHcBHyABLH + OLHyOLH (ICLHHH)
AHHc
A
Hy
A
HH + 
B
HHc
B
Hy
B
HH + 
AB
HHc
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
HH + 
O
HHy
O
HH
 AHLcAHyAHL + BHLcBHyBHL + ABHLcAHcBHyABHL + OHLyOHL: (ICHLHH)
We rst establish that it is not optimal to make the expected payments, namely ykijs, random.
This is because if a ykij is random for an ij and k, then the seller could replace it with its expected
value without a¤ecting the incentive conditions (because they are linear in ykij) and increase her
revenue (as the sellers revenue is a concave function of ykij).
Proposition 7 If the buyers preferences are represented by CARA utility function then, in an
optimal auction, the expected payments conditional on types and allocation must be deterministic.
Now, we determine which of the six conditions in the relaxed problem are binding.
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Lemma 3 At the optimum of the relaxed problem, IRLL must be binding.
Lemma 4 At the optimum of the relaxed problem, ICLLLH and IC
LL
HL must be binding.
Lemma 5 At the optimum of the relaxed problem, at least one of ICLLHH ; IC
LH
HH and IC
HL
HH must
be binding.
Using the above lemmata, we write the Lagrangian of the relaxed problem and derive its Kuhn-
Tucker conditions with respect to the payments, namely ykijs Then, we establish the relation among
the payments using these Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the details of which we relegate to the appendix.
Similar to the single object case, when a buyer wins an object, say object i, for which he has
high valuation, he pays viH more than what he would have paid if he lost that object. The intuition
for proposition 1 also applies here.
If the objects are not limited, the seller can make the high-type buyers probability of obtaining
the object(s) equal to one in order to reward him for revealing his true valuation(s). However, when
the objects are limited, the same rewarding strategy does not work because each high-type buyer
may face the risk of losing the object(s) to another high-type buyer and hence, the marginal utility
of income may di¤er in the events of winning and losing. The resource constrained seller, however,
can reward a high-type buyer by o¤ering perfect insurance and increase her revenue. Note that, if
buyers are risk neutral, there is no insurance issue. In other words, if the buyers are risk averse
the seller has an additional tool to extract more revenue from them when compared to risk neutral
environment.
Proposition 8 Each buyer is perfectly insured against the risk of losing the object(s) for which he
has high valuation.
When it comes to the LL-type buyers, the seller faces the following predicament: to extract
more revenue from the LL-type buyer by o¤ering insurance and to exploit the risk-bearing of the
buyers who have high-valuation for one or both of the objects to screen them. At the optimum,
the marginal benet of exploiting high-type buyers risk bearing exceeds the marginal cost of not
o¤ering insurance to LL-type buyers. Moreover, LL-type buyers pay penalty when he loses both
objects which further deters high-type buyers from behaving as if they are LL-type.
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Proposition 9 Suppose that type LL is not excluded from the auction. Then, he incurs a positive
payment if he loses both objects.
With the help of the preceding results, the sellers problem can be written as
[HH ^
A
HH + HL^
A
HL] ln
1
cAH
+ [HH ^
B
HH + LH ^
B
LH ] ln
1
cBH
+ HH ln y
O
HH
+HL[^
B
HL ln y
B
HL + (1  ^BHL) ln yOHL] + LH [^ALH ln yALH + (1  ^ALH) ln yOLH ]
+LL[
A
LL ln y
A
LL + 
B
LL ln y
B
LL + 
AB
LL ln y
AB
LL + 
O
LL ln y
O
LL]
subject to
DLL = 1
DLLLH = ^
A
LHc
A
Ly
A
LH + (1  ^ALH)yOLH
DLLHL = ^
B
HLc
B
Ly
B
HL + (1  ^BHL)yOHL
yOHH = min
8>>>><>>>>:
DLLHH
^ALHc
A
Hy
A
LH + (1  ^ALH)yOLH
^BHLc
B
Hy
B
HL + (1  ^BHL)yOHL
where ^Aij = 
A
ij + 
AB
ij and ^
B
ij = 
B
ij + 
AB
ij : Lets call this problem SP
0:
Thus, for the optimality of an auction only the following reduced form probabilities matter:
f^Aij ; ^Bijgij=HH;HL;LH ; fkLLgk=A;B;AB
Consider a mechanism where, for a given prole, ; both objects are sold with probability one.
Then, if the seller modies the mechanism by increasing pkij() by
1
nij
"kij , the following condition
must hold: X
ij2S
("kij + "
AB
ij )  0 for k = A;B:
After this modication, kij will increase by
1
ij
"kij	:
We now establish that the solution to the relaxed problem is weakly e¢ cient. That is, if there
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is a buyer with high valuation for an object then that object is never sold to a buyer who has low
valuation for that object.
Proposition 10 Let  = (nHH ; nLH ; nHL; nLL) be the prole of the participating buyers. Then,
the solution to the relaxed problem satises the following two rules:
i) For any  with nHH + nHL > 0; nHH p^AHH() + nHLp^
A
HL() = 1
ii) For any  with nHH + nLH > 0; nHH p^BHH() + nHLp^
B
LH() = 1:
If there is a buyer who has a high value for object A (B) then with probability one it is given
to a buyer who has a high value for it. While proposition 10 states this result in terms of actual
probabilities, the following corollary does the same in terms of the expected probabilities.
Corollary 1 At the optimum of the relaxed problem, reduced form probabilities satisfy
i) HH ^AHH + HL^
A
HL =
1
n(1  (BL )n) and
ii) HH ^BHH + LH ^
B
LH =
1
n(1  (AL)n):
The next lemma establishes that both objects are sold with probability one, if a buyers payment
contingent on winning an object for which he has low valuation is larger than his payment contingent
on losing both objects.
Similar to the previous section, we assume that the seller never keeps the object. We have
already established in proposition 10 that the seller does not keep an object whenever there is a
buyer who has a high value for it. This requires the probability that an object is won by a buyer
who has a low value for it to be equal to the probability that all buyers have low value for it.
LL^
A
LL + LH ^
A
LH =
1
n
(AL)
n
LL^
B
LL + HL^
B
HL =
1
n
(BL )
n
In terms of actual probabilities, we can write these conditions as
For any  with nHH + nHL = 0; nLH p^ALH() + nLLp^
A
LL() = 1 (17)
For any  with nHH + nLH = 0; nHLp^BHL() + nLLp^
B
LL() = 1 (18)
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Proposition 11 The necessary conditions for 17-18 are yALH > y
O
LH ; y
B
HL > y
O
HL; and y
A
LL; y
B
LL; y
AB
LL >
yOLL:
Since DHH = yOHH  1, when HH loses both objects he either does not pay anything (i.e.
yOHH = 1) or he is compensated (i.e. y
O
HH < 1).
Proposition 12 In any mechanism that solves the relaxed problem, if an HH type buyer loses both
objects then he is compensated.
This proposition results because the seller needs to provide insurance to type HH. This is
a property that carries over from the single unit optimal auction. (Maskin and Riley [19]) They
show that when the type space is continuous, the seller provides full insurance (and hence full
compensation) only to the highest type but partial insurance to the types that are su¢ ciently high.
Proposition 13 In any mechanism that solves the relaxed problem, if all the buyers are of type LL
(i.e. nLL = n) then the objects are bundled and each buyer wins the bundle with equal probability.
(i.e. pABLL () =
1
n).
An immediate implication of the proposition above is that it is not optimal to sell the goods
independently in which case with positive probability the objects may end up in the hands of
di¤erent LL type buyers. Yet, the proposition has further implications.
When the buyers are risk neutral (Armstrong [1]), depending on how buyersvaluations are
correlated across objects, the optimal multi-object auction can take the form of independent auc-
tions, mixed auction or bundling auction. But all of these auction forms allocate the two objects
independently and randomly when all buyers are of type LL. This contradicts with the proposition.
Therefore, none of these auction forms are optimal when the buyers are risk averse.
Theorem 1 Whenever the parameter values are such that the relaxed method solves the full prob-
lem, the three auction formats that are optimal when the buyers are risk neutral do not maximize
the sellers revenue if the buyers are risk averse.
The main reason as to why we obtain this contradictory result is that the optimal auction forms
for the risk neutral buyers do not impose the right amount of risk on type LL. The optimal auction
25
for risk averse buyers, on the other hand, imposes two kinds of risk on this type. The rst kind
removes the possibility of winning a single object when all buyers are of type LL and the second
kind assigns a positive payment if he doesnt win any objects. These two kinds of risk improve
the sellers revenue in the following way. The former exploits the risk bearing of the buyers who
have high valuation for one or both objects by facing them with even greater risk when imitating
LL than the optimal auction for risk neutral buyers. The latter, on the other hand, help the seller
collect the penalty fees from more people.
Since the seller probabilistically assesses the buyer valuations (i.e. only ex ante probabilities
of the type distribution matter) and never keeps the objects by assumption, there always exists a
probability that LL type buyers can obtain both objects. This can happen only if all buyers are of
type LL. On the other hand, whenever there is a type HH or both HL and LH, then LL cannot
win any objects. The following lemma states the conditions under which an LL can obtain a single
object.
Lemma 6 In any mechanism that solves the relaxed problem,
i) if  is such that nLH ; nLL > 0 and nLH +nLL = n; then object A is sold to an LH type buyer
(i.e. nLH p^ALH() = 1) if
LH < (
HL
yOHL
yOHH
HH
+ 1)(
LL
yOLL
yOLH
LH
+ 1) 1  LH : (y)
Otherwise, an LL type buyer gets object A (i.e. nLLp^ALL() = 1).
ii) if  is such that nHL; nLL > 0 and nHL + nLL = n; then object B is sold to an HL type
buyer (i.e. nHLp^BHL() = 1) if
HL < (
LH
yOLH
yOHH
HH
+ 1)(
LL
yOLL
yOHL
HL
+ 1) 1  HL: (z)
Otherwise, an LL type buyer gets object B (i.e. nLLp^BLL() = 1):
According to the previous lemma, in the optimal auction, if the excess payment that LH makes
for object A is larger than that of LL (namely, tALH   tOLH > tALL   tOLL), then LH wins object A.
By this lemma, the solution to the relaxed problem depends on the values of LH and HL:
Note that, LH  1 if and only if HL  1: Thus, we can divide the rest of the analysis into three
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Figure 2: Allocation of each object when all buyers have low valuation for it.
cases (See Figure 2):
 LH + HL  1 (Region A1),
 1  LH + HL  2 (Region A2),
 2  LH + HL (Region A3).
Remark 2 Readers should note that the three cases listed above are analogous to those mentioned
in Lemma 2 of Armstrong [1]: strong positive correlation, weak positive correlation, and negative
correlation, respectively.
Whether object A (B) is given to an LL or LH (HL) type buyer depends on whether (LH ; HL)
falls in region A1, A2; or A3:
3.2.2 Case A1 - Strong positive correlation:
[LH + HL  1] We can set
LL = 1  LH   HL, LH = LH , HL = HL (19)
In this case, all incentive constraints of type HH are binding. This also implies that the seller is
indi¤erent between LH and LL for object A and between HL and LL for object B.
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For any given allocation probabilities, the payments
fyALL; yBLL; yABLL ; yOLL; yALH ; yOLH ; yBHL; yOHL; yOHHg39 (20)
solve
max HH ln y
O
HH + LH(1  ^ALH) ln yOLH + HL(1  ^BHL) ln yOHL ++LLOLL ln yOLL (21)
+LH ^
A
LH ln y
A
LH + HL^
B
HL ln y
B
HL + LL
A
LL ln y
A
LL + LL
B
LL ln y
B
LL + LL
AB
LL ln y
AB
LL
subject to
ALLc
A
Ly
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Ly
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Lc
B
Ly
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL = 1 (22)
ALLc
A
Ly
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Hy
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL = ^
A
LHc
A
Ly
A
LH + (1  ^ALH)yOLH (23)
ALLc
A
Hy
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Ly
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Hc
B
Ly
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL = ^
B
HLc
B
Ly
B
HL + (1  ^BHL)yOHL (24)
ALLc
A
Hy
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Hy
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL = y
O
HH (25)
^ALHc
A
Hy
A
LH + (1  ^ALH)yOLH = yOHH (26)
^BHLc
B
Hy
B
HL + (1  ^BHL)yOHL = yOHH : (27)
By 19 and lemma 6,
yALHy
O
LL = y
A
LLy
O
LH and y
B
HLy
O
LL = y
B
LLy
O
HL (28)
must also be true. Using equations 22-27, and the two conditions in 28, we can solve for eight of
the variables (say, except yOHH) listed in 20 in terms of y
O
HH ; the parameters and the reduced form
probabilities. After plugging these variables into the objective function 21 we can solve it for yOHH .
Now, we consider the conditions that we have omitted in the relaxed problem.
Proposition 14 (Full problem - Case A1) The upward incentive conditions, ICLHLL , IC
HL
LL , IC
HH
LH
39The payments that are not listed in (20), namely yBLH ; y
AB
LH ; y
A
HL; y
AB
HL; y
A
HH ; y
B
HH ; y
AB
HH ; can be calculated using
proposition 15.
28
and ICHHHL are not binding.
The above proposition states that type LL does not have incentive to imitate the types LH or
HL. Moreover, neither type LH nor type HL has incentive to imitate HH.
The conditions ICHLLH and IC
LH
HL together imply
yOHHf
ALH
^ALH
A
cAH
+ (
ABLH
^ALH
  
AB
HL
^BHL
)
cALc
B
H   cAHcBL
cAHc
B
H
+
BHL
^BHL
B
cBH
g (29)
 yOHLfAHL
A
cAH
  
AB
HL
^BHL
(1  ^BHL)
cALc
B
H   cAHcBL
cAHc
B
H
+
BHL
^BHL
(1  ^BHL)
B
cBH
g
+ yOLHfBLH
B
cBH
+
ABLH
^ALH
(1  ^ALH)
cALc
B
H   cAHcBL
cAHc
B
H
+
ALH
^ALH
(1  ^ALH)
A
cAH
g:
where i = ciH   ciL.
ICHHLL takes the following form:
1  yOHHfAHH
cAL
cAH
+ BHH
cBL
cBH
+ ABHH
cALc
B
L
cAHc
B
H
+ OHHg (30)
and HL  1 can be written as
LHHL
LLHH
 y
O
LHy
O
HL
yOLLy
O
HH
(31)
Proposition 15 The optimal allocation probabilities satisfy the necessary condition 31. Moreover,
29 and 30 are not binding.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In a binary model, we show that when the buyers are risk-averse, the optimal auction is weakly
e¢ cient. That is, with probability one each object is sold to a buyer who has high valuation for it,
if such a buyer exists. Each buyer is perfectly insured against the risk of losing the object(s) for
which he has high valuation. Buyers who are eager to win both objects are compensated if they
lose both objects; whereas, buyers who have low value for both objects make a positive payment
to the seller if they lose both objects. The optimal auction must bundle the two objects when all
buyers have low value for both objects. This result allows us to conclude that the auction forms
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listed in Armstrong [1] are not optimal.
In a more general framework, it has been shown that among all mechanisms for allocating
multiple objects that are strongly e¢ cient, incentive compatible, and individually rational, the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the expected revenue.40 The optimal multi-object
auction that we have constructed for risk averse buyers is incentive compatible and individually
rational but is only weakly e¢ cient.
While the ine¢ ciency may result either because some types are ex ante excluded from partici-
pating in the auction, or because of a misallocation, in this paper, we conned ourselves to the rst
kind of ine¢ ciency, and showed that the latter kind of ine¢ ciency does not occur in an optimal
auction. Yet, this result is very sensitive to relaxing the assumption of binary type distribution.
Armstrong [1] shows that weak e¢ ciency does not survive once the type space is made continuous.
Finally, we comment on the restrictions of our model. For tractability reasons, we focused only
on the case where the buyersutility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. Instead a
buyers utility may exhibit increasing or decreasing absolute risk aversion, in which case the answer
to the optimal design problem is not clear. Alternatively, one can also consider the situations where
the buyers have di¤erent risk attitudes with respect to each good, in addition to that with respect
to the wealth level. In that case, one would have to consider a generalization of the Arrow-Pratt
theory (Arrow [3] and Pratt [25]) which extends to the case of multi-dimensional risk attitudes.
One such generalization is proposed by Kihlstrom and Mirman [13].
Gal-Or [11], considers the case where the risk-averse buyers worry about the possibility of
breakdowns. She shows that running "sales" improves the revenue of the single-unit monopolist.
This is because the risk-averse buyers tend to buy more frequently than necessary to avoid buying
at the higher regular price and to avoid the cost of waiting for the next sales period. Since, in
our model, the seller owns only one unit of each object and the objects are not related, our results
would not change if the buyers worry about breakdowns. In this case, buyers concerns can be
easily embodied into their valuations.
40For a clear and concise discussion of VCG mechanisms see Krishna [14].
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Appendix A: Optimal single object auction
The Lagrangian to the relaxed problem can be written as
L =    L(DL   1)  H(DH  DLH)
 fH;Lg(nLL + nHH   1)  fHg(nHH   1 + nL)
 fLg(nLL   1 + nH)
where L and H are the Lagrange multipliers on IRL and ICH , respectively, and fH;Lg, fHg,
and fLg are the multipliers on the implementability conditions.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose rst that IRL is slack. Then, the seller can improve her revenue
by increasing ylL by " =
1 DL
2 > 0. This would not violate any of the constraints of the relaxed
problem. So, IRL must be binding.
Suppose, next, that ICH is slack. Then, again, the mechanism can be improved protably,
without violating any of the conditions considered in the relaxed problem. Namely, increasing ylH
by " = D
L
H DH
2 > 0 improves the revenue: Hence, ICH is also binding.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose, by contradiction, that IRH is binding. Then, we have 1 = DH =
DLH = DL, where the equalities are due to IRH , ICH , and IRL, respectively. Yet, since low-type
buyers are not excluded, this would contradict with DL  DLH = L(cL   cH)ywL > 0: Hence, IRH
is slack.
Proof of Proposition 1. Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to ywH and y
l
H yield
@L
@ywH
= HH
1
ywH
  HHcH = 0
@L
@ylH
= H(1  H)
1
ylH
  H(1  H) = 0
These equations together imply that ylH = cHy
w
H :
Proof of Proposition 2. Remember that IRH is slack by Lemma 2. Using Proposition 1, we
can rewrite this condition as
DH = y
l
H < 1:
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This is equivalent to tlH < 0; implying that, at the optimum, an high-type buyer is compensated
when he loses the object.
Proof of Proposition 4. Armed with the optimal values of H ; and L;(see 9) we will now
calculate the payments made by each type of buyer. Using ICH , IRL; and proposition 1, we write
the payments, ywL ; y
l
L; and y
w
L ; as
ywL =
1 ylH
L(cL cH) ; y
l
L =
cLy
l
H cH
(1 L)(cL cH) ; y
w
H =
ylH
cH
where ylH is in
argmax
ylH
fn
r
[H(H ln
1
cH
+ ln ylH) + L(L ln(1  ylH) + (1  L) ln(cLylH   cH))]g:
Equivalently, ylH solves the rst-order condition of the form
H
ylH
+
H(1  L)cL
cLylH   cH
  LL
1  ylH
= 0:
This equation can be rewritten as
cL(y
l
H)
2   ylH + HcH = 0 (32)
where  = (1  L)(cL + HcH) + L(cH + HcL):
Since 0 < L < 1 and cH < cL,  > (cH + HcL) must be true. Then, 
2   4HcLcH >
(cH+HcL)
2 4HcLcH = (cH HcL)2  0. Thus, a solution to equation 32 exists. Furthermore,
if a buyer of type H loses the object he pays
ylH =
 +
p
2   4HcLcH
2cL
:
Proof of Proposition 5. We have already established above that IRL and ICH are binding
and IRH is slack. We only need to show that ICL is slack. Equivalently, we need to show that
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Ly
w
L < Hy
w
H :
41 Plugging in the values of ywL and y
w
H gives
1  ylH
(cL   cH) <
Hy
l
H
cH
() cH
HcL + (1  H)cH
< ylH :
We substitute in the value of ylH to get
cLcH + H [HcL + (1  H)cH ]2 < [HcL + (1  H)cH ]:
Substituting in the value of  and using IMfH;Lg yields
0 < c2LH(n  1) + c2H(1  H) + cLcH [(2  n)H   1]:
Now, we plug in the value of H and rewrite this condition as
0 < (1  nL)[c2L(n  1)  c2H + cLcH(2  n)] + (1  L)[c2Hn  cLcHn]:
Since c2Hn cLcHn < 0; we can replace (1 L) with (1 nL) and get the following more restrictive
condition
0 < (1  nL)(n  1)(cL   cH)2;
which holds for any parameter values. Hence, ICL must be slack.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that twi and t
l
i [hence y
w
i and y
l
i] are stochastic. Replacing y
w
i
and yli with their expected values would not a¤ect any of the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality conditions (because buyersutilities are linear with respect to these variables), but would
strictly improve the sellers revenue (as revenue is concave with respect to ywi and y
l
i), which is a
contradiction.
Appendix B: Optimal multi-object auction
We can write the Lagrangian of the relaxed problem as
41We add up ICH (binding) and ICL (slack).
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L = HHfAHH ln yAHH + BHH ln yBHH + ABHH ln yABHH + OHH ln yOHHg
+HLfAHL ln yAHL + BHL ln yBHL + ABHL ln yABHL + OHL ln yOHLg
+LHfALH ln yALH + BLH ln yBLH + ABLH ln yABLH + OLH ln yOLHg
+LLfALL ln yALL + BLL ln yBLL + ABLL ln yABLL + OLL ln yOLLg
+LLf1  ALLcALyALL   BLLcBLyBLL   ABLL cALcBLyABLL   OLLyOLLg
+LHfcAL [ALLyALL   ALHyALH ] + cBH [BLLyBLL   BLHyBLH ]
+ cALc
B
H [
AB
LL y
AB
LL   ABLHyABLH ] + [OLLyOLL   OLHyOLH ]g
+HLfcAH [ALLyALL   AHLyAHL] + cBL [BLLyBLL   BHLyBHL]
+ cAHc
B
L [
AB
LL y
AB
LL   ABHLyABHL] + [OLLyOLL   OHLyOHL]g
+HH(LLfcAH [ALLyALL   AHHyAHH ] + cBH [BLLyBLL   BHHyBHH ]
+ cAHc
B
H [
AB
LL y
AB
LL   ABHHyABHH ] + [OLLyOLL   OHHyOHH ]g
+ LHfcAH [ALHyALH   AHHyAHH ] + cBH [BLHyBLH   BHHyBHH ]
+ cAHc
B
H [
AB
LHy
AB
LH   ABHHyABHH ] + [OLHyOLH   OHHyOHH ]g
+ HLfcAH [AHLyAHL   AHHyAHH ] + cBH [BHLyBHL   BHHyBHH ]
+ cAHc
B
H [
AB
HLy
AB
HL   ABHHyABHH ] + [OHLyOHL   OHHyOHH ]g)
Since the number of buyers participating in the auction are assumed to be larger than three
and since buyers of each type are treated the same in a symmetric auction, each types probability
of losing both objects is positive. That is, Oij > 0 for all ij 2 S: Thus, using the four Kuhn-Tucker
conditions, @L
@yOij
= 0;
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@L
@yOHH
= OHH [
HH
yOHH
  HH ] = 0
@L
@yOLH
= OLH [
LH
yOLH
+ HHLH   LH ] = 0
@L
@yOHL
= OHL[
HL
yOHL
+ HHHL   HL] = 0
@L
@yOLL
= OLL[
LL
yOLL
  LL + LH + HL + HHLL] = 0
we can solve for ijs:
HH =
HH
yOHH
HL =
HL
yOHL
+
HH
yOHH
HL
LH =
LH
yOLH
+
HH
yOHH
LH
LL =
LL
yOLL
+
LH
yOLH
+
HL
yOHL
+
HH
yOHH
:
The remaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions are of the following form
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@L
@yAHH
= AHH [
HH
yAHH
  HHcAH ] = 0
@L
@yBHH
= BHH [
HH
yBHH
  HHcBH ] = 0
@L
@yABHH
= ABHH [
HH
yABHH
  HHcAHcBH ] = 0
@L
@yAHL
= AHL[
HL
yAHL
  (HL   HHHL)cAH ] = 0
@L
@yBHL
= BHL[
HL
yBHL
  (HLcBL   HHHLcBH)] = 0
@L
@yABHL
= ABHL[
HL
yABHL
  cAH(HLcBL   HHHLcBH)] = 0
@L
@yALH
= ALH [
LH
yALH
  (LHcAL   HHLHcAH)] = 0
@L
@yBLH
= BLH [
LH
yBLH
  (LH   HHLH)cBH ] = 0
@L
@yABLH
= ABLH [
LH
yABLH
  cBH(LHcAL   HHLHcAH)] = 0
@L
@yALL
= ALL[
LL
yALL
  cAL(LL   LH) + cAH(HL + HHLL)] = 0
@L
@yBLL
= BLL[
LL
yBLL
  cBL (LL   HL) + cBH(LH + HHLL)] = 0
@L
@yABLL
= ABLL [
LL
yABLL
  cAL(LLcBL   LHcBH) + cAH(HLcBL + HHLLcBH)] = 0:
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that IRLL is slack. Then, we have
DLL  ALLcALyALL + BLLcBLyBLL + ABLL cALcBLyABLL + OLLyOLL < 1:
Since number of buyers are larger than three and since buyers are treated symmetrically, each types
probability of losing both objects is positive. So, OLL > 0. Thus, an increase in y
O
LL by "=
O
LL for
" = (1 DLL)=2 > 0 strictly improves sellers payo¤. Note that, this modication on yOLL does not
violate any of the constraints, yielding a contradiction.
Hence, IRLL must be binding.
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Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose rst that ICLLLH is slack. Then, we have
DLH  ALHcALyALH + BLHcBHyBLH + ABLHcALcBHyABLH + OLHyOLH
< ALLc
A
Ly
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Hy
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL  DLLLH
Let " = (DLLLH  DLH)=2: Since OLH > 0; if we increase yOLH by "=OLH ; sellers payo¤ will improve
and none of the constraints are violated. This is a contradiction. So, ICLLLH must be binding.
Along the same lines, we can easily show that ICLLHL is binding, too.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that all three conditions are slack. Then, we have DHH <
minfDLLHH ; DLHHH ; DHLHHg: Dene " = (minfDLLHH ; DLHHH ; DHLHHg DHH)=2: An increase in yOHH in the
amount of "=OHH ; improves sellers payo¤ and does not violate any of the conditions. This is a
contradiction. So, at least one of these three conditions must be binding.
Proof of Proposition 8. Since DHH = minfDLLHH ; DLHHH ; DHLHHg, we can replace the last
three incentive compatibility conditions with DHH = LLD
LL
HH + LHD
LH
HH + HLD
HL
HH where
LL; LH ; HL  0 and LL + LH + HL = 1 provided that ij = 0 if and only if DHH < DijHH
(or equivalently, ij > 0 if and only if DHH = D
ij
HH):
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to ykij for k = A;B;AB and ij 2 S can be written as
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AHHHH [y
O
HH   yAHHcAH ] = 0 (a)
BHHHH [y
O
HH   yBHHcBH ] = 0 (b)
ABHHHH [y
O
HH   yABHHcAHcBH ] = 0 (c)
AHLHL[y
O
HL   yAHLcAH ] = 0 (d)
BHL[
HL
yBHL
  HH
yOHH
HL(c
B
L   cBH) 
HL
yOHL
cBL ] = 0 (e)
ABHL[
HL
yABHL
  cAH(
HH
yOHH
HL(c
B
L   cBH) +
HL
yOHL
cBL )] = 0 (f)
ALH [
LH
yALH
  HH
yOHH
LH(c
A
L   cAH) 
LH
yOLH
cAL ] = 0 (g)
BLHLH [y
O
LH   yBLHcBH ] = 0 (h)
ABLH [
LH
yABLH
  cBH(
HH
yOHH
LH(c
A
L   cAH) +
LH
yOLH
cAL)] = 0 (i)
ALL[
LL
yALL
  LL
yOLL
cAL   f
HL
yOHL
+
HH
yOHH
(HL + LL)g(cAL   cAH)] = 0 (j)
BLL[
LL
yBLL
  LL
yOLL
cBL   f
LH
yOLH
+
HH
yOHH
(LH + LL)g(cBL   cBH)] = 0 (k)
ABLL [
LL
yABLL
  LL
yOLL
cALc
B
L  
LH
yOLH
cAL(c
B
L   cBH) 
HL
yOHL
cBL (c
A
L   cAH)
 HH
yOHH
(cALc
B
L   LHcALcBH   HLcAHcBL   LLcAHcBH)] = 0: (l)
Note that, these equations are of the form kij
 = 0. We can use them to solve for y
k
ij for ij 2 S
and k = A;B;AB; by implicitly assuming that kij = 0: This is without loss of generality, because
each of these ykijs appears with the corresponding 
k
ij everywhere in the problem. Thus, if 
k
ij = 0
for a type ij and for an event k, then the value of ykij will not matter in the solution, if 
k
ij > 0, on
the other hand, then 
 = 0 must be true.
Thus, equations (a)-(d) and (h) respectively yield
yAHH =
yOHH
cAH
; yBHH =
yOHH
cBH
; yABHH =
yOHH
cAHc
B
H
;
yAHL =
yOHL
cAH
; yBLH =
yOLH
cBH
;
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and the pairs (e),(f)and (g),(i)respectively give
yABHL =
yBHL
cAH
; yABLH =
yALH
cBH
:
These two sets of equations imply that the excess payment that a buyer makes for an object for
which he has high valuation is equal to his valuation for that object. In other words, each buyer is
perfectly insured against the risk of losing the object(s) for which he has high valuation.
Proof of Proposition 9. Similarly, equations (e),(g),(j),(k) and (l) can be used to solve for
yBHL; y
A
LH ; y
A
LL; y
B
LL and y
AB
LL , respectively.
LH
yALH
=
LH
yOLH
cAL +
HH
yOHH
LH(c
A
L   cAH)
HL
yBHL
=
HL
yOHL
cBL +
HH
yOHH
HL(c
B
L   cBH)
LL
yALL
=
LL
yOLL
cAL +
HL
yOHL
(cAL   cAH) +
HH
yOHH
(HL + LL)(c
A
L   cAH)
LL
yBLL
=
LL
yOLL
cBL +
LH
yOLH
(cBL   cBH) +
HH
yOHH
(LH + LL)(c
B
L   cBH)
LL
yABLL
=
LL
yOLL
cALc
B
L +
LH
yOLH
cAL(c
B
L   cBH) +
HL
yOHL
cBL (c
A
L   cAH)
+
HH
yOHH
(cALc
B
L   LHcALcBH   HLcAHcBL   LLcAHcBH)
Remember from rst section that a low-type buyer has to make a payment if he cannot win the
object. Using the last three of the above equations we get a similar result for type LL.
Using the last three equations, one can write
yALL =
yOLL
cAL+"1
; yBLL =
yOLL
cBL+"2
; yABLL =
yOLL
cALc
B
L+"3
for some "1; "2; "3 > 0: We plug these values into LLs individual rationality constraint to get
yOLL(1  ALL
"1
cAL + "1
  BLL
"2
cBL + "2
  ABLL
"3
cALc
B
L + "3
) = 1:
Note that, the term in the parenthesis is less than one if LL gets either or both objects. Thus,
if OLL 6= 1; then yOLL > 1 (hence, tOLL > 0) must be true.
Proof of Proposition 10. i) Let  be such that nHH + nHL > 0 and without loss of generality
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assume that nHH > 0: Now, suppose by contradiction, that nHH p^AHH() + nHLp^
A
HL() < 1: Let
"  1  nHH p^AHH()  nHLp^AHL():
There are three possibilities that we need to consider:
- nLH + nLL = 0 :
In this case, modify the mechanism by increasing pAHH() by
"
nHH
: This would increase ^AHH by
	 "HH . Change in the Lagrangian can be calculated as 	" ln
1
cH
> 0: This is a contradiction.
- nLH p^ALH() > 0 :
We will now show that for some " < nLH p^ALH(); decreasing p^
A
LH() by
"
nLH
; and increasing
p^AHH() by
"
nHH
is protable. After this modication, ^ALH decreases by 	
"
LH
and ^AHH increases
by 	 "HH :
42 We calculate the change in the Lagrangian as
L = 	"fln 1
cAH
  ln y
A
LH
yOLH
+ LH [c
A
L
yALH
LH
  y
O
LH
LH
]  HHLH [cAH
yALH
LH
  y
O
LH
LH
]g
= 	" ln
yOLH
cAHy
A
LH
which is positive since yOLH > cHy
A
LH :
- nLLp^ALL() > 0 and nLH p^
A
LH() = 0 :
Suppose rst that nLLpALL() > 0: Then consider modifying the mechanism by decreasing p
A
LL()
by "nLL and increasing p
A
HH() by
"
nHH
for some " < nLLpALL(): This would decrease 
A
LL by 	
"
LL
and increase ^AHH by 	
"
HH
: Lagrangian then changes by
L = 	"fln 1
cAH
  ln y
A
LL
yOLL
+ (LL   LH)[c
A
Ly
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]  (HL + HHLL)[
cAHy
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]g
= 	" ln
yOLL
cAHy
A
LL
> 0
Suppose now that nLLpALL() = 0: Then, nLLp
AB
LL () > 0 must be true. We will show that
the following modication is protable: For some " < nLLpABLL (); decrease p
AB
LL () by
"
nLL
and
increasing pABHH() by
"
nHH
: This would decrease ABLL by 	
"
LL
and increase ^AHH and ^
B
HH by
42 p^ALH() can be decreased either by decreasing p
A
LH() or p
AB
LH(): If the former, is positive then we decrease p
A
LH()
(and increase pAHH()): If the former is zero, however, p
AB
LH() should be decreased (and in response p
AB
HH() should
be increased) In this case, marginal probabilities of winning A and B are a¤ected for both types HH and LH. Yet,
either modication, have the same e¤ect on the Lagrangian.
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	 "HH : As a result, Lagrangian will increase by
L = 	"fln 1
cAH
+ ln
1
cBH
  ln y
AB
LL
yOLL
+ LL[
cALc
B
Ly
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]
 LH [c
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]  LH [c
A
Hc
B
Ly
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]
 HHLL[
cAHc
B
Hy
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]g
= 	" ln
yOLL
cAHc
B
Hy
AB
LL
> 0
Thus, we conclude that if  is such that nHH + nHL > 0; then nHH p^AHH() + nHLp^
A
HL() = 1:
We can prove part ii) of the Lemma along the same lines.
Proof of Corollary 1. We will prove only part i): Proof of part ii) is similar. (*5) implies that
HH ^
A
HH =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
nHH p^
A
HH()	
HL^
A
HL =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
nHLp^
A
HL()	:
Adding these two equalities and multiplying both sides with n gives
n[HH ^
A
HH + HL^
A
HL] =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
[nHH p^
A
HH() + nHLp^
A
HL()]n	
=
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
n	 
nX
nLH=0
n!nLHLH 
n nLH
LL
nLH !(n  nLH)!
= 1  (LH + LL)n:
The second equality follows from the part i of proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 11. i) Suppose that the prole is such that nHH + nHL = 0; but
nLH p^
A
LH() + nLLp^
A
LL() < 1: Let " < 1   nLH p^ALH()   nLLp^ALL(): There are two cases that we
need to consider:
- nLH > 0 : Lets increase p^ALH() by
"
nLH
; which would increase ^ALH by 	
"
LH
: Change in the
41
Lagrangian is calculated as
L = 	"fln y
A
LH
yOLH
+ LH [ cAL
yALH
LH
+
yOLH
LH
] + HHLH [c
A
H
yALH
LH
  y
O
LH
LH
]g
= 	" ln
yALH
yOLH
which is positive if yALH > y
O
LH ; or
cAL cAH
1 cAL
< LH
yOLH
yOHH
HH
1
LH
:
- nLH = 0 : A protable modication would be to increase pALL() by
"
nLL
and hence ALL by
	 "LL : Lagrangian will increase by
L = 	"fln y
A
LL
yOLL
  (LL   LH)[c
A
Ly
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
] + (HL + HHLL)[
cAHy
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]g
= 	" ln
yALL
yOLL
which is positive if yALL > y
O
LL; or
cAL cAH
1 cAL
< LL
yOLL
(HL
yOHL
+ HH
yOHH
(1  LH)) 1:
ii) Along the same lines of the previous part, we can easily show that this part holds, too, if
yBHL > y
O
HL and y
B
LL > y
O
LL, or equivalently if
cBL   cBH
1  cBL
< minfHL
yOHL
yOHH
HH
1
HL
;
LL
yOLL
(
LH
yOLH
+
HH
yOHH
(1  HL)) 1g:
Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose, for now, that HH is not compensated. Then yOHH = 1:
Since cAH < c
A
L and c
B
H < c
B
L ; we have 1 = y
O
HH  DijHH  Dij  1 for ij = LL;LH;HL where
the rst inequality is due to ICijHH ; and the last inequality is the individual rationality constraint.
So, all individual rationality constraints are binding and Dij = D
ij
HH = 1 for ij = LL;LH;HL:
Moreover, since Dij  DijHH = 0; we have
ALL(c
A
L   cAH)yALL + BLL(cBL   cBH)yBLL + ABLL (cALcBL   cAHcBH)yABLL = 0
^ALH(c
A
L   cAH)yALH = 0
^BHL(c
B
L   cBH)yBHL = 0
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Each term in these equations are nonnegative, therefore ALL = 
B
LL = 
AB
LL = ^
A
LH = ^
B
HL = 0 must
be true. This contradicts with the previous Corollary because LL^ALL + LH ^
A
LH > 0:
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose, by contradiction, that for some prole  with nLL = n,
pABLL () <
1
n : Since both objects are sold with probability one, this implies that p
A
LL() = p
B
LL() > 0:
Let " < 1   npABLL (): Consider modifying the mechanism by decreasing pALL() and pBLL() both
by "n and increasing p
AB
LL () by
"
n . This would imply 
AB
LL =  ALL =  BLL = 	 "LL : Now, we
calculate the change in the Lagrangian:
L = 	" ln y
O
LLy
AB
LL
yALLy
B
LL
which is positive if yOLLy
AB
LL > y
A
LLy
B
LL or, equivalently, if
LL
yALL
LL
yBLL
>
LL
yOLL
LL
yABLL
() (LHHL + LLHHLL)(cAL   cAH)(cBL   cBH) > 0:
Since the last inequality holds for any parameter values, this modication is protable. Thus, we
conclude that if all the buyers are of type LL then the objects are bundled and each buyer gets the
bundle with equal probability.
Proof of Theorem 1. Any of the three auction formats, namely independent auction, bundling
auction and mixed auction, that are optimal when the buyers are risk neutral allocate the objects
independently and randomly when all buyers report to be of type LL.
Yet, by proposition 21, when the buyers are risk averse, a necessary condition for the optimality
of the auction is to give both object to the same buyer if all buyers are of type LL.
Proof of Lemma 6. i) Suppose that for some  with nLH ; nLL > 0 and nLH + nLL = n;
nLH p^
A
LH() < 1: Then, since A is sold with probability one, p
A
LL() must be positive. Let " <
nLLp
A
LL(): Now, consider modifying the mechanism by decreasing p
A
LL() by
"
nLL
and increasing
p^ALH() by
"
nLH
: This, would decrease ^ALL by
	"
LL
and increase ^ALH by
	"
LH
: As a result, the
Lagrangian will change by
L = 	" ln y
A
LHy
O
LL
yOLHy
A
LL
:
This is positive if yALHy
O
LL > y
O
LHy
A
LL; or equivalently if
LH
yOLH
LL
yALL
> LH
yALH
LL
yOLL
: Using the Kuhn-Tucker
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conditions, we can rewrite this inequality as
(LH   HHLH)[cAL(LL   LH)  cAH(HL + HHLL)] >
(cALLH   cAHHHLH)(LL   LH   HL   HHLL):
After some manipulation, we get
LH(HL + HHLL) > HHLH(LL   LH)
(
HL
yOHL
yOHH
HH
+ 1)(
LL
yOLL
yOLH
LH
+ 1) 1 > LH :
Proof of part ii) is similar.
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